@2b2rich wrote:
Understand that, I am in no way trying to be rude. . .
You asked me to please cite to some legal authority that states ‘no longer owes the debt’. The definition (Merriam-Webster) of ‘owe’ is: ‘to be under obligation to pay or repay in return for something received’. My legal authority that I believe supports this is the actual discharge document where it defines ‘Debts that are Discharged’, reads: ‘The Chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor’s legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged’. So, my reasons are that, if you are legally not obligated to pay a debt, then you no longer fit the definition of ‘owe’. the Discharge redefines the debtor as no longer owing it, even if it is still owed to the creditor.
First and foremost, your highlighting and/or comments are not "rude". Our discourse is based upon intelligent thought processes therefore your input is appreciated and pointing out where we disagree simply leads to a better understanding when responding.
The "law" is not precise and that is the reason we have judges who interpret the law. I do understand where you are coming from and, while the outcome is the same, your analysis of the language of the law is at issue. In the legal profession, the language contained in a Statute must be given its plain meaning unless ambiguous. 11 U.S.C. § 524 is not ambiguous.
A good example of how this works in a court can be seen in the following case:
In re Irby, 337 B.R. 293,295 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2005)
“(I)t is evident that the Plaintiffs' have based the success of their cause of action on a common misconception of bankruptcy law: that the bankruptcy discharge eliminates the very existence of a debt. But this is not the case. Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code does it provide that a debt is extinguished. Instead, § 524. . . limits its breadth to "operat[ing] as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action" to collect or recover a debt. The statute then goes on to limit the applicability of this "injunction" with this important proviso: "as a personal liability of the debtor[.]" In this way, upon discharge, it is only a debtor's personal obligation to pay the debt that is effectively extinguished; the debt itself remains. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S.Ct. 2150 2153, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991).
In many instances, of course, such a distinction is purely academic. The effect of a creditor being legally enjoined from pursuing recourse against a debtor will, in large percentage of instances, forever bar the creditor from seeing payment on their debt; thus, such creditor will be provided scant comfort in the knowledge that, from a legal standpoint, their debt remains technically in existence. .” (Emphasis added.)
It is important to note that the above example cites to the USSC case of Johnson v. Home State Bank therefore the USSC has made this proposition the "law of the land".
See also the unpublished opinion of Plan Adm'r for the Gail & Rice, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Gail & Rice, Inc. (Bankr. E.D. Mich., 2011) which notes that, “Section 524 makes clear that once a bankruptcy court has entered an order of discharge, it is only a debtor's personal obligation to pay the debt that is effectively extinguished; the debt itself remains. . . (Citing to In re Irby)”
For a few published opinions of a similar type see:
In re Porcoro, 565 B.R. 314 (Bankr. N.J., 2017);
In re Wimmer, 512 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2014);
In re Montano, 488 B.R. 695 (Bankr. N.M., 2013)
I hope this clears up the issue and just maybe gives you, and all who read this, insight as to how courts interpret laws.
Des.
but I appreciate all of the time you've taken to help explain it. I'm sure as things progress, the fog will clear little by little and it will all make sense. You can't fault someone with little experience in seeing my point of view, initially.