Some more info on ILLINOIS Statute of Limitations being considered as written contract or open account:
“The test for whether a contract is written under the statute of limitations in Illinois is not whether the contract meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, but whether all essential terms of the contract, including the identity of the parties, are in writing and can be ascertained from the written instrument itself.” Brown v.
Goodman, supra, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 940-41 (emphasis added).
If any essential element of the contract is omitted from the writing, “‘then the contract must be treated as oral for purposes of the statute of limitations.’” Armstrong v. Guigler, 174 Ill. 2d 281, 288, 673 N.E.2d 290, 295 (1996); accord, Toth v. Mansell, 207 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669, 566 N.E.2d 730, 733 (1st Dist. 1990); Schmidt v. Niedert, 45 Ill. App. 3d 9, 13, 358 N.E.2d 1305 (1st Dist. 1976).
“Illinois courts give a strict interpretation to the meaning of a written contract within the statute of limitations. For statute of limitation purposes, a contract is considered to be written if all the essential terms of the contract are in writing and are ascertainable from the instrument itself.” Brown, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 939. If the agreement necessitates resort to parol testimony to make it complete, the law is that in applying the statute of limitations, it must be treated as an oral contract. Toth, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 671.
“The law is clear in Illinois that to constitute a written contract under the statute of limitations, the written instrument itself must completely identify the parties to the contract.” Brown, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 940 (emphasis added); accord, Railway Passenger & Freight Conductors’ Mutual Aid & Benefit Association v. Loomis, 142 Ill. 560, 32 N.E. 424 (1892); Munsterman, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 238-39; Pratl v. Hawthorn-Mellody Farms Dairy, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 344, 347, 368 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1st Dist. 1977); Matzer v. Florsheim Shoe Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d 470, 472, 270 N.E.2d 75 (1st Dist. 1971); Wielander v. Henich, 64 Ill. App. 2d 228, 231-32, 211 N.E.2d 775, 776 (1st Dist. 1965).
“The issue is not whether the identity of [the parties] can be readily ascertainable from subsequent writings, the issue is whether the identity of [the parties] can be readily ascertained” from the alleged written contract “so as to avoid the resort to parol evidence.” Brown, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 940.
If testimony is necessary to establish any of these elements, the contract is treated as oral, and subject to the five-year statute. Wielander v. Henich, 64 Ill.App.2d 228, 231, 211 N.E.2d 775, 776 (1st Dist. 1965); Armstrong, 174 Ill. 2d at 288.
In the parol evidence cases, the dispositive question is whether evidence of oral representation is necessary to establish the existence of a written contract. If such evidence is required, then the contract is treated as oral for purposes of the statute of limitations. In other words, where a party is claiming a breach of written contract, but the existence of that contract or one of its essential terms must be proven by parol evidence, the contract is deemed oral and the five-year statute of limitation applies.
You can read full document here:
http://www.edcombs.com/CM/Custom/col...ndefense07.pdf
